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 Choice and Equality 
Are vulnerable citizens worse-off after liberalization reforms?1 
ABSTRACT 
In recent decades, we have witnessed a massive restructuring of public service delivery mechanisms, 
including service liberalization reforms, the pursuit of the choice agenda and the creation of quasi-
markets. A central aim of these reforms is that citizens receive better value for money through greater 
competition among service providers. However, it is debated whether all layers of society are equally able 
to benefit from these developments. We assess the equality in citizens’ choice behaviour with regard to 
liberalized services of general interest across 25 countries of the European Union. Our findings show that 
the gap between lesser and better educated service users, in terms of actual switching behaviour, widens 
once a considerable degree of service liberalization, as evidenced by the number of service providers, has 
been achieved. However, this has been only found in the mobile telephony sector and not in the less 
competitive market of fixed telephony services. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Although citizens’ responses to poorly performing public services have featured on the research agenda 
for some time (see most prominently Hirschman 1970; Lyons et al. 1992), recent years have seen an 
upsurge in interest in studying responses to public services, including citizen satisfaction (Van Ryzin and 
Charbonneau 2010; James 2009), their behaviour when dealing with poor performance (Gofen 2012; Jilke 
and Van de Walle 2013) and the link between these two aspects (Dowding and John 2011, 2012; Salucci 
and Bikers 2011). Following large-scale public service reforms, such as service liberalization, the pursuit of 
the ‘choice agenda’ and the creation of quasi-markets (Clifton and Diaz-Fuentes 2010; Le Grand 2007), 
attention has been drawn to the outcome of these reforms for ordinary citizens (Clifton et al. 2011a, 2012; 
Florio 2013; Grosso and Van Ryzin 2012). 
A central aim of these reforms was that citizens, now perceived of as consumers (Clarke et al. 2007), would 
receive greater value for money through competition among providers. Public service users, in turn, were 
thought to be able to make well-informed choices and opt for the optimal service provider (European 
Commission 2004). However, it is debated whether all layers of society are equally able to do so. 
Commentators have claimed that the marketization of public service delivery and the insertion of greater 
choice into the public sector might well have fostered a ‘two-track’ public service where so-called 
potentially vulnerable service users are less likely to benefit from public service reforms than their 
relatively ‘strong’ counterparts (Clifton et al. 2011a; Needham 2003). Despite these concerns, substantive 
evidence of negative effects of greater choice on equality in public service provision is lacking.  
In France they have a saying “trop de choix tue le choix”, meaning that too much choice kills the choice 
(Economist 2010). While most experiences within the public sector reject the notion that increasing 
choice necessarily leads to a halt in using the service or an end to switching providers (e.g. Le Grand 
2007), in this paper we go one step further by investigating whether ‘too much’ choice harms the choices 
made by lower socio-educational groups - those who are regarded as potentially vulnerable service users. 
In this study, we examine the cognitive ability element of vulnerability by looking at service users 
educational attainment. We investigate whether ‘too much’ choice harms the choices made by potentially 
vulnerable service users, such as those who are less well educated. We offer an empirical look at equality in 
 citizens’ choice behaviour (switching to another service provider) when it comes to liberalized services of 
general interest, and particularly in terms of mobile and fixed telephony, in 25 countries of the European 
Union (EU), by asking if potentially vulnerable service users become less likely to switch away from their 
current service provider once the number of providers increases. Doing so, this article is structured as 
follows: the next section introduces liberalization reforms in services of general interest and studies that 
have looked at their effects on citizens’ attitudes and behaviours. We then address the commonly 
articulated reproach - that reforms for greater provider choice foster inequalities between service users - 
and discuss the theoretical and empirical literature regarding reforms in the ‘services of general interest’ 
telecommunications sector. Drawing upon the literature on biases in decision-making, we develop our 
theoretical framework. Subsequently, we introduce our data, measures and methodology, and then test our 
theoretical framework. Finally, we discuss the findings from statistical tests and extract implications for 
theory and practice. 
  
LIBERALIZING PUBLIC SERVICES AND ITS EFFECTS ON CITIZENS 
The European integration process and the creation of a single market fostered the liberalization of 
services of general interest and made them subject to greater competition (Héritier 2001; Prosser 2005), 
leading to the creation of liberalized markets for public service provision (Clifton and Diaz-Fuentes 2010). 
These markets seek to overcome the market failure situations that typically occur when public services are 
provided through a monopolistic provider, by establishing a market environment where, ideally, multiple 
service providers compete for customers (Savas 1987; Ostrom and Ostrom 1971). Further, through 
market signalling, this is expected to create incentives for providers to deliver greater value for money in 
order to keep existing customers as well as attract new ones. A key attribute in the provision of services of 
general interest such as water, electricity, or telecommunication services, is that the classical exit option of 
completely withdrawing from the service in question is often not feasible, too difficult, associated with 
extremely high costs (see Clifton et al. 2011a), or even may harm citizens’ individual welfare. Services of 
general interest are, furthermore, regarded as essential public services and "[...] subject to specific public service 
obligations by virtue of a general interest criterion" (Commission of the European Communities 2004, citied after 
 Van de Walle 2008, 7; see also Clifton and Diaz-Fuentes 2005; 2010). It is because of this general interest 
character that equality in terms of accessibility and the provision of services of general interest, is regarded 
as crucial in all EU member countries (Clifton, Comin, Diaz-Fuentes, 2005; Prosser 2005). 
For citizens, changing the delivery and supply arrangements of services formerly provided by public 
monopolies meant that they were no longer regarded as mere legal subjects, but as vocal and empowered 
consumers (Aberbach and Christensen 2005; Clarke et al. 2007). They were put in a position to 
autonomously make choices as to which service providers best matched their needs and demands. 
Experiences in the US telecommunications sector showed that service users were indeed more likely to be 
better off after switching (Eppling 2003), while evidence from the UK’s electricity market suggests that 
some service users failed to identify the appropriate supplier for their levels of consumption (Wilson and 
Waddams Price 2010). However, greater provider choice has not always become available within all the 
liberalized sectors in the EU. The rail transport sector, for example, has remained strongly regulated in 
most countries, whereas competition and choice is observable in many EU member countries in terms of 
mobile telecommunications (Conway and Nicoletti 2006; European Commission 2010). 
The general process of public service liberalization has been criticized as mainly advantaging the 
comparatively strong and well-positioned service users, and leaving behind those who are viewed as 
potentially vulnerable, such as the low educated (Clifton et al. 2011a; also Gottfried 2001). The literature 
suggests that while comparatively strong and well-educated service users are more prone to take decisions 
regarding the services they receive that come close to an optimum, when compared to potentially 
vulnerable service users. This can lead to a service delivery system where potentially vulnerable service 
users receive least value for money. In terms of services of general interest, numerous observers have 
shown that various potentially vulnerable service users are indeed least satisfied with the services they 
receive (Bacchiocchi et al.  2011; Clifton et al. 2011a; Ferrari et al. 2010; Florio 2013: Fiorio and Florio 
2010; Poggi and Florio 2009). Moreover, liberalization reforms have been found to decrease service 
satisfaction across a whole range of services of general interest (Bacchiocchi et al. 2011; Ferrari et al. 2010; 
Fiorio and Florio 2010). However, no clear evidence is available about whether the gap in satisfaction 
levels between different socio-economic groups increases (or decreases) as liberalization reforms move on.  
 Other research on liberalization reforms has attempted to identify inequality effects on public service 
users’ actual market behaviour or their financial situation within those markets (Clifton et al. 2011; Jilke 
and Van de Walle 2013; Poggi and Florio 2009). These studies find that inequalities in actual spending, 
complaints and experiencing financial problems in paying service bills are apparent for numerous groups 
of potentially vulnerable service users. However, empirically attributing these vulnerability-effects to the 
liberalization reforms proves difficult. For example, it may also be possible that potential vulnerable public 
services users were already in disadvantaged positions prior reforms took place. This clearly justifies 
further research. Furthermore, within this stream of the literature, there is little evidence available on the 
extent to which service users, and in particular those who are regarded as potentially vulnerable, exercise 
what was argued to be a core element of service liberalization reforms and greater competition - namely 
user choice. 
 
EQUALITY AND CHOICE BEHAVIOUR IN LIBERALIZED PUBLIC SERVICE 
MARKETS 
Few studies have examined equality in provider choice by looking at direct and/or indirect effects of 
socioeconomic aspects on service users’ switching behaviours. Ranaganathan et al. (2006) show that young 
service users are more likely to switch their mobile providers than older users, arguing that this is a 
reflection of their active market behaviour and high service usage (see also Grzybowski 2008). Eppling 
(2002) studied the effects of switching on price discrimination among different users groups. Her results 
indicated that non-switchers were more likely to have paid higher prices. Her findings further showed that 
education is positively and income negatively related with switching – that the poor seem to more actively 
search for better offers. Because of this they also may end up with better offers. Regards education, the 
author explained her finding by arguing that information is crucial for making choices and finding a better 
provider, and that the more highly educated service users were more likely to have better access to 
information. This is so because low search costs are crucial to identify an optimal provider. Moreover, 
they have greater cognitive abilities to process such information and thus experience greater transaction 
costs in accessing and processing needed information. Hence, there is considerable evidence that service 
 users who are regarded as potentially vulnerable, such as those who are less well educated, face greater 
hindrances in making ‘optimal’ choices because of the increased transaction costs they face in accessing, 
processing and comparing information. However, one also has to consider the distinct dimensions of 
vulnerability, income and education, tap in. While the relationship between income and choice is rather 
rational and most likely also related to search opportunity costs, the negative relationship between 
education and switching stems from structural disadvantages these vulnerable service users face. 
The structural disadvantages potential vulnerable services users, such as those with a low level of 
education, have in choosing among service providers is further reinforced by insights from decision 
theory. This stream of the literatures suggest that as the amount of information to be processed grows, 
decision-making becomes poorer and also less likely (Chen et al. 2009; Hwang and Lin 1999; Lee and Lee 
2004). This is mainly because individuals have limited capacities to deal with information for making 
decisions, and when those limits are reached, individuals tend to become confused (Miller 1956; 
Timmermanns 1993). As a result, the likelihood of staying with one’s current service provider increases 
because this represents a safe haven, a so-called ‘satisficing’ option – a situation which has been more 
generically described as a ‘status-quo bias’ (Samuelson and Zeckerhauser 1988). Related to this idea is the 
concept of default-effects (Wilson, Garrold and Munro 2013), where individuals have a tendency to stay 
with the status-quo even when switching would potentially benefit them. Here it is argued that the reason 
why people often stick with the default are not only the direct transaction costs such as actual switching 
costs, but also related to indirect transaction costs such as search costs (see also Wilson 2012). 
Studies in the field of applied psychology indicate that increasing the number of alternatives first results in 
a positive effect on consumers’ choice behaviour, but eventually the effect becomes negative (Botti and 
Iyengar 2006, 2004; Iyengar and, Lepper 2000; Schwartz 2005; Shah and Wolford 2007), supporting the 
assumptions linked to information overload. Iyengar and Lepper (2000) were able to identify choice 
overload in a simple buying environment using a rather large number of alternatives (24), as have later 
studies (Botti and Iyengar 2006, 2004). In this regard, Shah and Wolford (2007) highlight the existence of 
a tipping point (between 10 and 12 alternatives) when there are too many alternatives to choose from, 
turning choice into too much choice. However, in the case of public service delivery, the number of 
 alternatives or available service providers citizens can choose from is typically smaller - we found a 
maximum of 13 service providers within mobile, and 10 within fixed, telephony markets. 
The fact that individual capabilities in processing information vary among different socio-educational 
groups, as does the propensity for taking a risk based on a possibly poor decision (Dohmen et al. 2010; 
Falch and Sangren 2006; Hjorth and Fosgerau 2010), means that potentially vulnerable service users are 
more likely to be risk-averse in terms of their switching decisions. This is mainly so because of their 
limited capacities in processing and evaluating necessary information, and the higher search costs they 
face. But choosing among an increasing set of options requires an increase in cognitive effort (Keller and 
Staelin 1987). Or in other words, increasing the number of choices affects consumers’ search costs to 
collect and interpret data on a variety of different offers, increasing their indirect transaction costs. 
Furthermore, in markets with an increasing number of providers to choose from, price discrimination and 
obfuscation are more prevalent, which further increases the complexity of choosing among a large set of 
providers. This further increases search costs for service users. We, moreover, argue that citizen-
consumers experience differing degrees of search costs, based on their level of vulnerability. This results in 
default-effects, and these default-effects increase with their level of vulnerability. If this is the case, then 
we would assume that, as the number of alternatives grows, the gap between different types of service 
users will widen. In other words, the difficulty in figuring out the optimal service offer increases as the 
number of service providers increases. That is, determining the optimal provider becomes more difficult 
for this particular group of public service users and making a choice then represents a risk to them. As a 
result, they are more likely to stick with their current provider and tend to become ‘locked-in’. This leads 
to the research question we aim to address in this study: Do potentially vulnerable service users - compared to less 
vulnerable users -  become less likely to switch away from their current service provider once the number of providers increases? 
 
THE EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATION SECTOR 
In this study, we look into citizens’ switching behaviour in a strongly marketized service sector - 
telecommunications. The European telecommunication sector has not only undergone liberalization 
reforms across all EU member countries, it also provides sufficient variance in the degree to which 
 reforms have resulted in greater competition and an increase in the number of service providers 
(European Commission 2010; Conway and Nicoletti 2006). In this sense, the European 
telecommunication sector has experienced a strong wave of liberalization efforts in the 1990s, aiming at 
the withdraw of market entry barriers and establishing a common European telecommunication market 
(Conway and Nicoletti 2006; see also Clifton, Comin and Diaz-Fuentes 2007). This was indeed one of the 
most ambitious liberalization projects of the European Commission (Belloc, Nicita and Parcu 2013), 
which served as an European-wide 'laboratory' for provider choice. However, while Conway and Nicoletti 
(2006) and their OECD-wide compilation of regulatory indicators indicate massive liberalization efforts, 
there remain some variation across countries. This is especially true with regard to effective competition 
between service providers within national markets. Thus one can see that we have an European 
telecommunication market that is on the one side highly liberalized, but on the other side differs with 
regard how those reforms have resulted in greater competition among providers, and choices available to 
citizens. This makes it an ideal case for our subsequent empirical analysis. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We use data from the European Commission’s Eurobarometer project. Eurobarometer surveys are known 
for their high quality and methodological rigour in both survey design and data collection. Adopting a 
multistage, random probability sampling procedure, information is collected, through face-to-face 
interviews at respondents’ homes (GESIS 2010) - yielding a total of 24,815 respondents. In our study, we 
use data from Eurobarometer 65.3 on services of general interest (European Commission 2006). The 
survey was fielded 2006 in 25 EU member countries. We filtered out those respondents who were not 
service users and deleted cases with item non-responses. This resulted in a sample of 15,143 mobile 
service users and 13,422 fixed telephony users. 
 
Dependent variables 
In our study, we examine individual level switching behaviour in 2006 within the mobile and fixed 
telephony sectors of the 25 member countries then part of the EU. Here, Eurobarometer 65.3 contains 
 relevant information on citizens’ switching behaviours in both sectors. More precisely, respondents were 
asked ‘Have you tried to or thought about switching your [insert service] provider in the last two years?’. Possible answers 
were: 1 ‘Yes, you switched and it was easy’, 2 ‘Yes, you switched but it was difficult’, 3 ‘Yes, you tried to switch but you 
gave up switching due to obstacles you faced’, 4 ‘No, you did not try because you are not interested in switching’ and 5 ‘No, 
you did not try because you thought it might be too difficult’. Our interest is in whether public service users have 
actually switched providers, and therefore we coded this as a dichotomous variable. Respondents that 
indicated that they had switched providers in the past two years were coded as ‘1’ while the non-switchers 
were coded as ‘0’. Overall, 18% of fixed telephony and 25% of mobile telephony users had switched their 
providers within the period surveyed. Figure 1 provides a disaggregated overview of switchers for both 
sectors and one can clearly see that there are significant differences in switching behaviour across 
countries. 
 FIGURE 1: Service users’ switching behaviour (percentages) 
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Source: Own calculations using EB65.3 data 
 
Potential vulnerability 
We argue that citizens’ switching behaviour differs in accordance to their vulnerability, which has been 
argued of being a latent concept - meaning that it is not directly observable. While potential-vulnerability 
can be operationalized in various ways (see for example OECD 2008), a low educational attainment has 
been one of the most remarkable and repeatedly used operationalizations (for example Burden 1998; 
Clifton et al. 2011a, 2011b; George et al. 2011; Jilke and Van de Walle 2013). This is not without a reason, 
educational attainment represents a particular element of the concept of vulnerability, that is cognitive 
ability. It largely affects consumers resources for participating in the market (Hogg et al. 2007). One the 
one side education impacts the development of skills for consumer empowerment, including the 
acquisition of information and the knowledge of how to interpret them (Brennan and Coppack 2008). On 
the other side, as suggested by Clifton et al. (2011), a low level of formal education is strongly associated 
with people's more limited resources for processing and evaluating information (see also Dohmen et al. 
2010; Hjorth and Fosgerau 2011). For our study, we look at the cognitive ability element of the concept of 
vulnerability, as we argue that especially people’s cognitive resources affect their choice behaviour. Doing 
so, we grouped respondents, based on their age when they left fulltime education, into three categories: 
 basic education, secondary education and higher education. Respondents who were still studying were 
assigned to one of the three categories based on their current age. 
 
Number of service providers 
The degree of choice that is available to public service users is measured through the number of service 
providers within national telecommunication markets. The European Commission provides estimates of 
the number of service operators within both telephony sectors. However, these numbers are based on 
different national definitions of which providers to include, and thus do not allow cross-national 
comparison. Therefore, we established our own values using a common definition of service provider: a 
public or commercial organization that provides voice telephony services on a national basis, thereby 
excluding, for example, those that offer only international calls. Service providers were identified from 
national network agencies and provider websites though an extensive web-search. This data has been 
collected by the author. We individually measure the number of providers of mobile and of fixed 
telephony who had entered the respective telephony market prior to January 2005. 
 
Control variables 
We controlled for a number of other socioeconomic variables, namely gender, age, employment status, 
place of residence and homeownership. Males have been shown to be more likely to switch their service 
provider and this is perceived to be because of their greater interest in technological innovation 
(Ranaganathan et al. 2006). Furthermore, we take into account that the elderly are thought be less active in 
their switching behaviour. Thus we control for respondents' age. Income has been shown to be negatively 
correlated with the likelihood of switching, as poorer people are more in need of better service offers 
(Eppling 2002). Given data limitations, we are not able to directly measure respondents’ incomes or 
wealth status, and instead use homeownership and employment status as proxy indicators. The place of 
residence should also be critical in providing services of general interest, as it is often argued that rural 
areas tend to be under-provided (Clifton et al. 2011b). We therefore also controlled for a respondent’s 
place of residence. 
 We also control for individual perceptions of service delivery, reflected in aspects such as the daily 
importance of the service, and switching barriers. Earlier studies into telecommunication switching 
behaviour have indicated the importance of service usage (Ranaganathan et al. 2006), with frequent users 
being more likely to change their provider. Thus, we control for the perceived importance of the services 
used daily, using a four-point Likert scale ranging from not at all important to very important. Another 
important aspect when it comes to switching behaviour in telecommunications is the barriers to switching 
(Kim et al. 2004; Lee et al. 2001). Hence, we take into account public service user’s perceptions of 
switching barriers, namely their evaluations of the ease of comparing offers from different providers and 
the extent to which consumer interests were protected. The ease of comparing offers was measured in the 
original survey using a four-point Likert scale ranging from ‘very difficult’ to ‘very easy’. Additionally, 
respondents had been asked to assess how well consumer interests were protected within each service 
market using a four-point Likert scale ranging from ‘very badly’ to ‘very well’. 
On the country level, we control for institutional switching barriers, for the average price for making a 
call, the total number of subscribers, and the market concentration. In terms of barriers to switching, we 
include measures for both the services being considered. Within national markets, the number portability 
rate - that is the average number of days it takes to transfer a phone number from one provider to another 
- is commonly applied as a measure of switching barriers (see European Commission 2010). Here, we 
chose to use the official figures for average number portability between two providers, as reported by the 
European Commission (2008). We also control for the actual price levels of the services. For fixed 
telephony, we use the costs of a ten-minute local call. In terms of mobile telephony, we use the average 
price per minute of a voice communication (European Commission 2009, 2010). However, since absolute 
price levels differ among countries, we have adjusted these prices by weighting them with their respective 
Purchasing Power Parities for 2006. Further, we recognize that the number of service providers may not 
only reflect the degree of market liberalization but also the size of the market. To control for this, we 
include the total number of network subscribers in 2006 as one of our country-level predictors. To also 
control for different degrees of market concentration within national markets, we added the Hirschman-
Herfindahl index (fixed telephony)/ Concentration ratio (mobile telephony) for service operators to our 
models. 
  
Modelling strategy 
Given the hierarchical structure of our data, individuals nested within countries, multilevel modelling 
techniques are required since these are able to correct for potential clustering effects and unobserved 
heterogeneity across countries (Hox 2002). Moreover, in order to be able to model individual level 
predictors of a binary dependent variable (in our case, citizens’ choice behaviour) and country level 
individual variables simultaneously, we estimate a logistic random intercept model. In our analysis, we 
grand mean centre all our continuous predictors such that the intercept can be interpreted as the value (in 
terms of the used indicators) attached to the average respondent. Our main individual level predictor 
education has been group mean centred as we are interested in the individual within-country effects of  
education, and not in structural differences across countries (Enders and Tofighi 2007). 
 
RESULTS 
For both mobile (Table 1) and fixed (Table 2) telecommunication services, we estimate three separate 
models. In the two tables, we report odds ratios and standard errors (in parentheses) but, because of space 
considerations, only the results from our main variables of interest are reported here, with complete 
results being included in the annex. The null model reflects an intercept-only model, which helps to assess 
how much of the variance can be attributed to differences between countries. In a second step, we added 
all our independent variables to the models, ignoring any potential interaction between the number of 
service providers and respondents' level of education. In the third model, we added cross-level interaction 
terms between choice and education. As regards mobile telephony, each model significantly improved its 
fit over the previous model (Table 1). This is reflected in the significant decrease in deviance (-2 Log 
likelihood) when applying a likelihood-ratio test. In the mobile telephony analysis, the intercept-only 
model revealed an interclass correlation of .101 indicating that roughly 10% of the total variance can be 
attributed to country differences. Our final model explains 54% of the variance that lies between 
countries. 
  
TABLE 1: Modelling citizens’ switching behaviour towards mobile telephony services (EU25) 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept .292** (.036) .195** (.045) .195** (.045) 
    
Number of service providers  1.112* (.052) 1.113* (.052) 
Basic education (Ref: higher education)  .864* (.059) .896 (.063) 
Secondary education (Ref: higher 
education) 
 .917 (.042) .933 (.044) 
    
Number of service providers X Basic 
education 
  .950* (.023) 
Number of service providers X Secondary 
education 
  .965* (.015) 
    
Variance: country intercept (SE) .609 (.091) .435 (.068) .435 (.068) 
Deviance 16,359.92 16,016.05 16,009.39 
Interclass correlation .101 .054 .054 
N (Individuals) 15,143   
N (countries) 25   
   Note: Results of control variables are provided in the annex; Odd ratios with standard errors in parenthesis are reported; 
      significance levels:  *p<0.05; **p<0.01; 
 
Many of the control variables made a statistically significant contribution to our models, and confirmed 
the expected effect directions. For example, females are also less likely to switch, so as those respondents 
that own a house, or are older than 69 years. Respondents that place a great daily importance on their 
mobile service are more likely to switch, so as those public service users that think there is no good 
protection of their consumer interests. Moreover, our main predictors of interest have the expected 
effects: being comparatively low educated decreases the likelihood of switching mobile service providers. 
Considering our level-2 predictors, our findings show that when the number of mobile service providers 
increases, the probability of switching also increases. This supports the notion that a greater choice does 
lead to a situation where service users are more likely to opt for another provider. We also find that a 
greater level of market concentration is associated with lower switching rates. The other country-level 
control variables were not statistically significant, but the indicated effects were in the expected directions. 
 Turning to the hypothesized interaction between education and the number of service providers, we find 
that our interaction term between being low educated and the number of service providers turns 
statistically significant. Thus, there is initial evidence for an interaction between education and greater 
choice. We further examined this relationship and calculated the marginal effects of basic education on 
switching (compared to a high level of education), contingent on the number of service providers, keeping 
all the other predictors constant at their mean values (see Brambor et al. 2006). The resulting graph (Figure 
2) reveals an interesting picture: the initially positive marginal effect on switching turns negative with more 
than five providers, but if we instead consider the 95% confidence interval then the band includes zero up 
to eight providers. This means that typically there is unlikely to be a negative effect of being low educated 
on the probability of switching within countries where there are less than eight mobile providers. 
However, if there are more than eight providers, the marginal effect of a low level of education on 
switching is clearly negative. Moreover, the revealed effect size is nontrivial; we find in national markets 
with 13 providers that individuals who are low educated are 9% less likely to switch when compared to 
their better-off counterparts. The 95% confidence bounds range between 3% and 15%. On the other side, 
in markets with 8 providers or less, there are no significant differences between low and well educated 
respondents. This shows that once the number of service providers reaches a threshold of eight service 
providers, less-educated service users become less likely to switch. 
  FIGURE 2: Marginal effects of being low educated on the probability of switching mobile 
services  contingent on the number of providers (95% confidence intervals) 
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We now turn to the results of our estimations for fixed telephony services (see Table 2). Here, the 
intercept-only model has an interclass correlation of .23, which means that 23% of the total variance in 
switching behavior is on level-2. Overall, model 1 significantly improves its fit over the intercept-only 
model by including additional parameters. However, our interaction model (Model 2) did not significantly 
improve its fit over model 1 - the difference between the deviances of the two models is too low to satisfy 
conventional significance levels. This indicates that our interaction terms fail to make a valuable 
contribution to explaining users’ switching behaviour. In terms of our control variables, some were found 
to be statistically significant, with effects in the anticipated directions. For example, respondents that 
regard the consumer interest protection in their country as bad are less likely to switch providers. Also, the 
elderly and those who are living in rural areas are less likely to exercise choice. Turning to our main 
predictors of interest, as expected, being less-well educated decreases the likelihood of switching service 
providers. This is in line with findings from the mobile telephony sector. 
 
 TABLE 2: Modelling citizens’ switching behaviour towards fixed telephony services (EU25) 
  Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept .131 (027) .048** (.016) .084** (.043) 
    
Number of service providers (log)  2.888** (.413) 1.716 (.678) 
Basic education (Ref: higher education)  .693** (.054) .553* (.128) 
Secondary education (Ref: higher 
education) 
 .845** (.048) .824** (.054) 
    
Number of service providers (log) X Basic 
education 
  1.161 (.168) 
Number of service providers (log) X 
Secondary education 
  1.015 (.021) 
    
Variance: country intercept (SE) .995 (.149) .283 (.056) .274 (.053) 
Deviance 11,355.11 11,119.03 11,115.81 
Interclass correlation .231 .024 .022 
N (Individuals) 13,422   
N (countries) 25   
   Note: Results of control variables are provided in the annex; Odd ratios with standard errors in parenthesis are reported; 
      significance levels:  *p<0.05; **p<0.01; 
 
On the country level, including the number of service providers did yield statistically significant estimates. 
Although the number of service providers has a positive effect on the likelihood of switching, it has a log-
linear form, suggesting diminishing marginal effects of the number of alternatives on citizens’ switching. 
Overall, this finding is in line with our results from the mobile telephony sector. Looking at country-level 
control variables, only our predictor of market concentration was found to be statistically significant. As 
the results for the mobile telephony sector do, this suggest that greater market concentration is associated 
with lower switching rates. The other controls do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. 
Evaluating our research question, we checked for a potential interaction effect between basic education 
and the number of service providers. While our statistical tests showed that education had indeed an 
individual effect on the likelihood of exercising choice, the data failed to identify any joint effect. Taking 
into account the identified interaction between education and the number of providers within the mobile 
telephony sector, our results regards the equality of liberalization reforms are mixed. An interesting 
question is why, with less well educated service users, an increasing number of service providers has a 
negative effect on the education-switching relationship only within the mobile sector? A first observation 
is that the mobile telephony market is much more strongly driven by new technological innovations that 
 require greater capabilities to follow than the fixed telephony market, which remains a relatively simple 
service. As such, the mobile service market can be regarded as a complex environment in which to make 
switching decisions, whereas, as observed by Iyengar and Lepper (2000), information overload is less likely 
to take place within rather simple environments. Moreover, the mobile telephony market is much more 
prone to competition with considerably more service providers on average (mean 7.1, standard deviation 
2.9) than the fixed telephony market (mean 3.4, standard deviation 2.4). The negative effect of too great a 
choice therefore may only unfold if the respective service sector is characterised by a strong market 
orientation with a comparatively large number of options. In the mobile telephony sector, this threshold 
seems to be at eight providers. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The introduction of choice and competition into public service delivery rests on the assumption that 
overcoming state monopoly-led provision of public services would result in a more efficient process of 
service delivery, and an increase in citizens’ welfare (Le Grand 2007; Ostrom and Ostrom 1971; Savas 
1987). For instance, this is done through shifting the autonomy for decision-making from the state to the 
citizen by creating markets for public services and letting service providers compete for customers. Public 
service users send market signals to suppliers by complaining, or switching service providers. As a result a 
better match between citizens’ demands and preferences, and the price and quality of the offered services 
would emerge. However, in our analysis we have shown that potentially vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
groups of citizens do not send market signals in the very same manner to providers under different levels 
of choice. In terms of equality, we have found that increasing the number of choices that are made 
available to citizens appear to work better in some public services as fixed telephony than in others as 
mobile telephony, mostly due to characteristics as the competitiveness of the market, and the overall 
service complexity. However, the question is not whether to open public service delivery for competition 
and provider choice, or not, but rather how much choice works for a given service. Once ‘too much’ 
choice is made available a choice-gap is likely to emerge. 
 One has to note that our results indicate that liberalizing public services does not per se negatively 
influence the switching behaviour of potential vulnerable groups but that, for this to occur, a certain 
threshold of provider choice must be exceeded. The circumstances under which the introduction of 
choice negatively impacts on the switching decisions of the potentially vulnerable are not clear cut and 
may vary across different public service sectors. We have identified criteria that, if satisfied, could result in 
liberalization reforms creating a ‘choice-gap’. This can occur if the public service sector exhibits a strongly 
liberalized and competitive environment with a high number of providers. Further, we suspect that the 
less complex an actual service is, the higher the number of providers needs to be before the negative 
potential becomes a reality. However, these criteria should be subjected to further testing by future 
research. 
There are, of course, some limitations of our analysis which we believe could be addressed by future 
research. In terms of the generalizability of the results, we cannot confidently claim that similar effects 
would be found for other types of public services such as employment services, gas, electricity or health 
care. Thus, future studies may look whether our results hold true for other types of public services. 
Furthermore, the availability of choice, or number of service providers within national markets, is a key 
goal of the EU liberalization agenda and has been argued to be positively related to the degree of 
competition within countries. However, the market share of single providers may differ across countries 
and thus not necessarily equate with the degree of competition. Our data does not allow to examine the 
overall market share of single providers, as such data is not publicly available (only on the level of 
operators). Instead, this study focuses on the availability of choice to public service users, and not 
competition per se, while controlling for the actual market concentration (using the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index/ concentration-ratio for service operators). We argue that it is important to estimate the relationship 
between the number of available alternatives in national markets and vulnerability, because a great variety 
of service offers was a key policy goal in the implementation of liberalization policies across the EU. Thus 
how service users respond to an increasing number of telephone providers within national markets is an 
important question of theoretical and practical pedigree. Furthermore, the exclusion of a measure for 
public service users’ income may bias our results. To account for this, we used income-related (state-of-
the-art) proxies as control variables, including respondents’ homeownership and employment status. We 
 also need to acknowledge the cross-sectional nature of our data. While we account for wide range of 
control variables at both, the individual and country level, we cannot confidently rule-out that our findings 
may be affected by other unobserved factors, or reverse-causality. Instead, what this study can do is to 
pinpoint an association between vulnerability and switching behaviour, which increases with a growing 
amount of options to choose from. Future studies are well advised to collect time series data for citizens’ 
switching behaviour to cross-validate our result. For now, our study results clearly show the interesting 
relationship between citizen vulnerability and decision making in public service markets. 
Our study has some important implications for policy makers and regulators. We have shown that an 
increased number of options to choose from can have heterogeneous effects on the switching behaviour 
of vulnerable and non-vulnerable service users. However, for this effect to unfold, a certain threshold 
must be reached (in our case eight providers), and the market needs to be strongly de-regulated. This may 
suggest to limit the number of licences awarded to providers in de-regulated markets. However, instead 
we would argue that potential vulnerable services users should rather receive greater attention in consumer 
protection policies. Most policy attention has gone into reducing switching costs (e.g. number portability 
rates), instead search costs seem to be as important. Thus establishing independent agencies that provide 
easily available information on service offers could be one possible responses to an increased market 
complexity, and help to reduce the 'choice-gap'. Another possible way to account for an increasing 
inequality in citizen choice behaviour could be service obligation contracts that protect the vulnerable. 
Such contracts outline arrangements between non-public service providers and the regulating public 
bodies (for an overview see Cheung 2005). They could, for example, include guidelines to strengthen the 
market situation of vulnerable customers across the EU. Additionally, organizing collective switching 
schemes, as in the electricity market in the UK (see for example UK Department of Energy and Climate 
Change 2013), could also be one interesting way to overcome inequalities in citizens' choice behaviour. In 
such switching schemes municipalities select providers for a large group of service users on a tender basis 
and then collectively switch to the one with the best service offer. Enrolment in such schemes is relatively 
easy and straightforward. However, whether this can accurately reflect heterogeneous consumer 
preferences – especially in the mobile telephony market – is not clear and should be the subject of future 
studies. 
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 ANNEX 
TABLE 3: Individual-level descriptive statistics 
 Mobile services (N= 15,143) Fixed services (N=13,422) 
 Mean SD Min; Max Mean SD Min; Max 
Education   1; 3   1; 3 
  Basic education .151 .358 0; 1 .205 .205 0; 1 
  Secondary education .488 .500 0; 1 .447 .447 0; 1 
  Higher education .361 .480 0; 1 .348 .348 0; 1 
Daily importance   1; 4   1; 4 
  Not at all important .014 .118 0; 1 .013 .115 0; 1 
  Not very important .109 .312 0; 1 .112 .315 0; 1 
  Fairly important .322 .467 0; 1 .404 .491 0; 1 
  Very important .555 .497 0; 1 .471 .499 0; 1 
Easy to compare   1; 4   1; 4 
  Very difficult .107 .309 0; 1 .105 .307 0; 1 
  Fairly difficult .228 .420 0; 1 .253 .435 0; 1 
  Fairly easy .403 .491 0; 1 .420 .494 0; 1 
  Very easy .261 .439 0; 1 .222 .416 0; 1 
Consumer interest protection   1; 4   1; 4 
  Very badly .056 .230 0; 1 .055 .228 0; 1 
  Fairly badly .222 .416 0; 1 .214 .410 0; 1 
  Fairly well .608 .488 0; 1 .605 .489 0; 1 
  Very well .114 .318 0; 1 .126 .332 0; 1 
Age (Ref: 15-69 years old) .050 .217 0; 1 .125 .330 0; 1 
Gender (Ref: female) .462 .499 0; 1 .448 .497 0; 1 
Employment categories   1; 6   1; 6 
  Managers and professionals .141 .348 0; 1 .139 .346 0; 1 
  Clerical workers .220 .415 0; 1 .195 .397 0; 1 
  Self-employed .065 .246 0; 1 .066 .248 0; 1 
  Working class .148 .356 0; 1 .115 .319 0; 1 
  Unemployed .059 .235 0; 1 .043 .203 0; 1 
  Not in Labour force .367 .482 0; 1 .442 .497 0; 1 
Place of residence   1; 3   1; 3 
  Rural village .337 .473 0; 1 .359 .480 0; 1 
  Small/ middle town .387 .487 0; 1 .375 .484 0; 1 
  Large town .276 .447 0; 1 .266 .442 0; 1 
Homeownership .460 .498 0; 1 .513 .500 0; 1 
 TABLE 4: Country-level descriptive statistics  
 Mean SD Min, Max Data source 
Number of Service Providers (mobile) 7.080 2.929 3; 13 Own collection 
Number of Service Providers (fixed) 3.440 2.399 1; 10 Own collection 
Portability (in days) (mobile) 6.580 5.179 1; 20 European Commission 
Portability (in days) (fixed) 9.080 6.855 0; 30 European Commission 
Price (in Euros, PPP adjusted) (mobile) .150 .058 .05; .27 European Commission 
Price (in Euros, PPP adjusted) (fixed) .366 .135 .19; .75 EUROSTAT 
Concentration Ratio (mobile) 47.520 14.104 25; 94 EUROSTAT 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (fixed) 6186.360 2202.385 2717; 9791 EC 
Subscribers (in thousands) (mobile) 19910.480 26042.187 347; 85700 EUROSTAT 
Subscribers (in thousands) (fixed) 9229.720 13857.309 208; 54400 ITU 
 
 TABLE 5: Results (additional to Tables 1 and 2) 
 Mobile telephony Fixed telephony 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Control variables     
Daily importance (Ref: Not at all important)     
  Not very important 1.397 (.272) 1.403 (.273) 1.333 (.331) 1.336 (.333) 
  Fairly important 1.661** (.314) 1.662** (.315) 1.234 (.298) 1.240 (.300) 
  Very important 2.066** (388) 2.071** (390) 1.471 (.354) 1.476 (.356) 
Easy to compare (Ref: Very difficult)     
  Fairly difficult 1.114 (.080) 1.116 (.081) 1.134 (.098) 1.132 (.098) 
  Fairly easy 1.263** (.090) 1.268** (.091) 1.117 (.095) 1.115 (.095) 
  Very easy 1.565** (.119) 1.570** (.119) 1.434** (.134) 1.433** (.134) 
Consumer interest protection (Ref: Very badly)     
  Fairly badly .935 (.082) .932 (.082) .980 (.107) .980 (.107) 
  Fairly well .681** (.058) .680** (.058) .728** (.076) .726** (.076) 
  Very well .731** (.074) .730** (.074) .684** (.084) .682** (.084) 
Age (Ref: 15-69 years old) .463** (.054) .465** (.054) .747** (.068) .744** (.068) 
Gender (Ref: female) 1.091* (.044) 1.089* (.044) .908 (.045) .908 (.045) 
Employment category (Ref: Managers and workers)    
  Clerical workers 1.049 (.070) 1.046 (.070) .993 (.081) .996 (.081) 
  Self-employed 1.117 (.103) 1.117 (.103) 1.115 (.124) 1.120 (.124) 
  Working class .987 (.076) .983 (.075) 1.174 (.112) 1.182 (.113) 
  Unemployed 1.091 (.106) 1.092 (.106) .939 (.125) .944 (.126) 
  Not in Labour force 1.007 (.064) 1.007 (.064) .864 (.068) .867 (.068) 
Place of residence (Ref: large town)     
  Small/ middle town .951 (.047) .949 (.047) .826** (.051) .825** (.051) 
  Rural village .917 (.048) .914 (.048) .835** (.053) .836** (.053) 
Homeownership .772** (.035) .772** (.035) .912 (.051) .912 (.051) 
Number portability (in days) .976 (.018) .976 (.018) 1.018 (.011) 1.011 (.012) 
Subscribers (in thousands) 1.000 (.000) 1.000 (.000) 1.000 (.000) 1.000 (.000) 
Price (in Euros, PPP adjusted) .987 (.017) .987 (.017) 1.010 (.006) 1.011 (.006) 
Market concentration .982* (.008) .982* (.008) .999** (.000) .999** (.000) 
 
 
 
 
